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Item Type:Ĭorrupt Organizational Hierarchies in the Former Soviet BlocĬorruption, hierarchies, transition, former Soviet Bloc This paper presents an overview of the research on corruption in organizations and develops models of corrupt organizations, including the vertical structure, the horizontal structure, and the hierarchy, as applied to transition economies.
Increasing scale and scope of corruption in the former Soviet Bloc, as well as numerous other countries, urges better understanding of the problem within the context of socio-economic transformations as it touches upon issues of organizational structures.
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